Conflicts of Interest and Disqualification in Intellectual Property Litigation by Flamm, Richard E. & Vapnek, Paul W.
California Western Law Review 
Volume 32 Number 2 Article 3 
1996 
Conflicts of Interest and Disqualification in Intellectual Property 
Litigation 
Richard E. Flamm 
Paul W. Vapnek 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr 
Recommended Citation 
Flamm, Richard E. and Vapnek, Paul W. (1996) "Conflicts of Interest and Disqualification in Intellectual 
Property Litigation," California Western Law Review: Vol. 32 : No. 2 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol32/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in California Western Law Review by an authorized editor of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu. 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND DISQUALIFICATION
IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION
RICHARD E. FLAMM AND PAUL W. VAPNEK**
INTRODUCTION
The concept that courts have the inherent power to disqualify attomeys,
when necessary, in the interests of justice, is not a new one,' and motions
seeking to disqualify attorneys from representing clients in intellectual prop-
erty cases have not been uncommon.2 In recent years, however, high-
powered law firms representing "high tech" companies have repeatedly been
the object of conflict of interest charges and disqualification motions;3 so
much so that one reporter recently referred to the filing of disqualification
motions in intellectual property cases as "Silicon Valley's Recurring
Nightmare."4
* Private Practitioner, Oakland, California, specializing in conflicts of interests matters. In
addition to handling dozens of disqualification motions and appeals, including those filed in Atasi
Corp. v. Seagate Technology, 847 F.2d 826 (Fed. Cir. 1988), and Truck Ins. Exchange v.
Fireman's Fund, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (1992), Mr. Flamm has spoken and
written extensively on related subjects, and has testified as an expert witness. Articles by Mr.
Flamm on conflicts of interests and other ethical topics have appeared in California Lawyer
Magazine, the Federal Litigator, the Los Angeles Daily Journal, the Florida Bar Journal, and
other publications. Mr. Flamm's first full-length legal treatise, Judicial Disqualification:
Disqualification and Recusal of Judges, was published by Little, Brown & Company in 1996.
His second treatise, Conflicts of Interest and Law Firm Disqualification, is to be published by
Banks & Jordan Law Publishing Company in August, 1996. Mr. Flamm is an officer of the Bar
Association of San Francisco Ethics Committee.
** Attorney, TOWNSEND and TOWNSEND and CREW. B.M.E., Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute, 1951; J.D., University of San Francisco School of Law, 1964. Mr. Vapnek has taught
both Intellectual Property Law and Professional Responsibility at Hastings College of the Law,
and is the author of numerous articles on intellectual property, conflicts of interest and
disqualification. Mr. Vapnek has also served as Chair of both the California State Bar
Committee on Professional Responsibility and the Bar Association of San Francisco Ethics
Committee.
1. See Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 529, 529-30 (1824) (the power to disqualify an
attorney from a case is "incidental to all courts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum,
and for the respectability of the profession").
2. See, e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982);
Novo Terapeutisk v. Baxter Travenol Labs., 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979); Schloetter v. Railoc,
546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976), all of which arose out of patent infringement litigation.
3. See Motion to Disqualify, Synoptics Communications, Inc. v. 3Com Corp., No C-94
20892 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 24, 1995); Cf Motion to Determine Propriety of Representation of
Adverse Parties, Cirrus Logic, Inc. v. Prakash Agarwal, et al., Santa Clara County Superior Court
Action No. CV 745373 (May 30, 1995); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Donaghy, 858 F.
Supp. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Palumbo v. Tele-Communications, Inc., 157 F.RD. 1229 (D.D.C.
1994).
4. See Walsh, Welcome to Silicon Valley's Recurring Nightmare, THE RECORDER, Sept. 29,
1995, at 2.
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While the factual basis for seeking disqualification varies from case to
case,5 an analysis of the many disqualification decisions which have been
issued in intellectual property actions suggests that three phenomena may help
to explain why disqualification motions appear to be "recurring" in this type
of case: (1) the lateral mobility of attorneys within the firm sought to be
disqualified; (2) the ambiguous nature of the relationships which sometimes
exist between intellectual property attorneys and persons other than their
paying clients; and (3) the problems courts experience in attempting to apply
the "substantial relationship test" to intellectual property cases.
In this article we discuss each of these bases for disqualification. We
conclude with a discussion of some of the prophylactic measures intellectual
property attorneys and firms can take to avoid becoming the object of
conflicts challenges in the future.
I. CONFLICTS PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE LATERAL MOVEMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ATTORNEYS
In 1988, the principal author of this article published an article on the
conflicts of interest problems faced by law firms due to mergers with other
firms or hiring established attorneys or practice groups.6 Since that time, the
perils associated with law firm mergers,7 de-mergers,8 and other types of
lateral movement,9 have become painfully familiar. In fact, several recent
disqualification motions can be attributed to just these types of transfers.10
On August 24, 1995, 3Com Corporation moved to disqualify the law firm
of Brobeck, Phleger & Harrision from representing its adversary, Synoptics
Communications, Inc., in a patent infringement action." The basis of the
motion was a conflict of interest 3Com contended arose due to attorney
Tower C. Snow, Jr. moving from another firm to Brobeck in January 1995.
Snow had represented 3Com in a variety of matters. 3Com contended that
Snow's representation of its interests did not terminate with his move to
5. See Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 919 F.2d 455, 460 (7th Cir. 1990)
(disqualification decisions are fact-specific).
6. See generally Richard E. Flamm, Importing Taint in Lateral Hires, CAL. LAW. MAG.,
Sept., 1988.
7. See, e.g., Picker Int'l Inc. v. Varian Associates, 670 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 (N.D. Ohio
1987) affd, 869 F.2d 578 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (a law firm cannot drop a less lucrative client like
a hot potato prior to the merger of two law firms in order to avoid a conflict and sue that client
on behalf of a second client).
8. See Elan Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., 809 F. Supp. 1383 (N.D. Cal.
1992).
9. See, eg., Motion to Disqualify, Synoptics Communications, Inc. v. 3Com Corp., No. C-
94-20892 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 24, 1995).
10. See, e.g., Motion to Determine Propriety of Representation of Adverse Parties, Cirrus
Logic, Inc. v. Prakash Agarwal, et al., Santa Clara County Superior Court Action No. CV 745373
(May 30, 1995).
11. Motion to Disqualify, Synoptics Communications, Inc. v. 3Com Corp., No. C-94-20892
JW (PVT) ENE (N.D. Cal., Aug. 24, 1995).
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Brobeck and that, because this was so, Brobeck was now in the position of
concurrently representing and suing it.' 2  The 3Com case was eventually
settled without the disqualification motion being decided.
The motion to disqualify Brobeck in 3Com followed hard on the heels
of Cirrus Logic, Inc.'s successful bid to preclude the law firm of Orrick,
Herrington & Sutcliffe (Orrick) from representing Cirrus' adversary,
Neomagic Corporation, in a trade secret dispute. 3 That case involved
former Jackson, Tufts, Cole & Black attorney Terence McMahon, whom the
court described as "a talented local practitioner."' 4 McMahon was represent-
ing Neomagic in a suit against Cirrus Logic, and hoped to keep the case when
he moved to Orrick, despite Orrick's concurrent representation of Cirrus in
an unrelated matter. Unlike many firms which wait to be challenged by a
disqualification motion before taking action on a conflict, Orrick took the bull
by the horns by filing a motion to have the court determine that its represen-
tation of Neomagic was proper, despite its concurrent adverse representation.
The court, however, denied its motion."
The 3Com and Cirrus motions both exemplify the types of conflict
concerns which arise in connection with lateral movement by a single partner.
This type of problem is multiplied when not only partners, but entire practice
groups, make a move. A case in point is Elan Transdermal Limited v.
Cygnus Therapeutic Systems.' 6 In that action, the plaintiff (Elan) initiated
a suit against its rival alleging infringement of its patent for a patch that
delivers nicotine through the skin. Elan's counsel in that case, the firm of
Irell & Manella, had previously acted as counsel for Cygnus for approximate-
ly four years. During its representation, Irell provided Cygnus with
intellectual property advice during the development of Cygnus' nicotine
patch. On the basis of this prior representation, Cygnus moved to disqualify
Irell from representing its competitor, Elan. 7
The relevant facts of the case were not in dispute. In the mid-1980s,
Cygnus was represented in intellectual property matters by the Menlo Park
law firm of Ciotti & Murashige.' On March 1, 1987, Ciotti merged with
Irell & Manella. The merged firm, Ciotti & Murashige, Irell & Manella,
continued to act as intellectual property counsel to Cygnus from March 1,
1987 to August 31, 1991.19 In September 1991, the Menlo Park office of
Irell de-merged. Almost all its personnel affiliated with Morrison & Foerster,
12. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disqualify, Synoptics Communications, Inc.
v. 3Com Corporation, No. C-94-20892 JWy (PVT) ENE (N.D. Cal., Aug. 24, 1995).
13. Order of the Honorable Conrad S. Rushing, Cirrus Logic, Inc. v. Prakash Agarwal, et
al., Santa Clara County Superior Court Action No. CV 745373 (June 20, 1995).
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. 809 F. Supp. 1383 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
17. Id. at 1384-85.
18. See id. at 1385 & n.1.
19. See id.
1996]
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including Thomas Ciotti, the partner in charge of the relevant patent work for
Cygnus. Cygnus subsequently retained Morrison and Foerster to handle its
patent work.20
Elan received its nicotine patch patent on August 7, 1990.2" On May
10, 1991, when Elan filed its patent infringement complaint, both Elan and
Cygnus had nicotine patches before the Food and Drug Administration for
testing and eventual clearance for marketing. Elan claimed the product
Cygnus was seeking FDA clearance for was within the scope of Elan's patent,
and that Cygnus had infringed its rights to that patent.22 Ciotti and most of
the other attorneys who worked on the Cygnus representation for Irell had
been based in Irell's Menlo Park office.23 Even so, when Elan substituted
attomeys from Irell's Los Angeles office in for the firm that had previously
represented it in the case against Cygnus, Cygnus promptly sought to
disqualify Irell.24
The thrust of Cygnus' claim was that Irell had breached Rule 3-310(D)
of the California Rules of Professional Conduct by accepting employment
adverse to the interests of a former client in a matter substantially related to
the work it had performed for that client.25 Irell countered by offering
declarations from its current attorneys who had charged time to Cygnus, or
who had been mentioned in other lawyers' records related to Cygnus.26 The
declarations disavowed any knowledge of the matters at issue in the pending
litigation.27 On this basis, Irell contended that no duty of confidentiality to
its former client was threatened by its current representation. Irell also
argued that Rule 3-3 10 and California case law applied only to individual
lawyers-not to a firm that had formerly represented a party it was now
litigating against.2"
Despite these protests, the district court found that the motion raised
"serious issues about the duties attorneys owe their former clients and the
lingering after-effects of the law firm merger boom."'29 Noting that a
tradition has developed that is "unbending and inveterate,"'3 the court held
that the presumption that members of a firm share client confidences is
conclusive under California law.' The court further found that, because the
20. Id. at 1385.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1385-86.
25. Id. at 1386-87.
26. Id. at 1387.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1388.
29. Id. at 1385.
30. Id. at 1384 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)).
31. See id. at 1390 n. II (citing Rosenfeld Construction Co. v. Superior Court, 286 Cal. Rptr.
609, 615 (Ct. App. 1991)).
[Vol. 32
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work Irell had performed for Cygnus and the work it did for Elan was
substantially related, there was no need to inquire whether relevant confiden-
tial information was actually in Irell's possession. 2 The court concluded
that "the time-honored rules designed to protect clients and the honor of the
legal profession are no less meaningful in a time of mergers and
de-mergers." '33 Because Irell had previously represented Cygnus on a
substantially related matter, and because Irell sought by its representation of
Elan to "attack the very fruits of its work as intellectual property counsel to
Cygnus," disqualification of the Irell firm was warranted. 4
As the foregoing examples indicate, there have been a number of recent
intellectual property cases in which disqualification motions have been
predicated primarily on lateral transfers by partners. However, this phenome-
non is not new, and older cases have also examined this problem.
In Novo Terapeutisk v. Baxter Travenol Labs.,35 a patent infringement
action, the court considered the appropriate ethical standard when a partner
leaves a law firm, takes a client with him, and then finds himself and his
client in litigation against a party represented by his former firm.36 The
Novo Terapeutisk court denied a defense motion to disqualify plaintiff's
counsel due to his and the client's prior association with the defendant's law
firm. The district court found no substantial relationship between the services
the challenged firm rendered to the former client and the new litigation. 7
On appeal, a panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding
the matters were substantially related. On rehearing en banc, however, a
majority of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
original order. The court found the challenged firm had successfully rebutted
the presumption that confidential information from the prior representation
had been shared with counsel representing the new client.39
Three circuit judges dissented from the en banc decision in Novo
Terapeutisk. One of them, Circuit Judge Sprecher, had authored an opinion
in which a panel of the same court reached a somewhat different result three
years earlier in Schloetter v. Railoc of Indiana, Inc.4" In that case the
plaintiff, Schloetter, alleged that defendant Railoc had infringed Scholetter's
patent. Defendant Railoc was represented by the Donnelly firm. During the
course of the litigation, Donnely's attorney discovered that a former Donnely
partner had substantially participated in the process of applying for the
32. Id. at 1390.
33. Id. at 1393.
34. Id.
35. 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979).
36. Id. at 186-88.
37. Id. at 195.
38. Id. at 192.
39. Id at 196-97.
40. 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976).
1996]
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original patent for Railoc's adversary, Schloetter.4i Schloetter moved to
compel the Donnelly firm to withdraw; the district court so ordered. On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the disqualification order.42 The circuit
court found that
it would be unreasonable to expect the public or clients like Schloetter, who
have reposed confidences in a member of a law firm, to accept the proposi-
tion that the danger of those confidences being used against the client in a
closely related matter has entirely dissipated upon the departure of the
individual member from the firm. 3
II. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ATTORNEYS AND "NON-CLIENTS"
The lateral mobility of intellectual property attorneys goes part of the
way toward explaining why motions for disqualification have sometimes been
made in these types of cases. However, not every disqualification motion
which has been made in intellectual property cases has been based on a
moving attorney conflict. In several intellectual property cases, disqualifi-
cation motions have been predicated upon the more traditional claim4" that
a client's former attorney has in his or her possession confidential information
which may be disclosed in the pending proceeding to the detriment of the
former client.45
Generally, an attorney cannot, upon termination of employment, represent
one whose interest in the same matter is adverse to that of his former
client.46 Typically, however, courts will not disqualify an attorney on the
basis of his former representation of a client in a different matter unless the
party seeking disqualification shows (1) that there was in fact an
attorney-client relationship between the movant and the attorney it seeks to
disqualify,47 and (2) that the matter on which the client was previously
represented is "substantially related" to the matter on which the attorney is
presently acting adverse to the former client's interests.48
41. Id at 708.
42. Id. at 713.
43. Id. at 711.
44. See Grunberg v. Feller, 505 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1986) ("The majority of
cases involving a motion to disqualify an attorney from representing a party deal with conflict
of interests where the attorney . . . has in his or her possession confidential information which
may be disclosed ... to the detriment of the adverse party." (citations omitted)).
45. See, e.g., DCA Food Indus., Inc. v. Tasty Foods, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 54, 59-60 (W.D.
Wis. 1985).
46. See, e.g., CAL. RuLES OF PROF. CoNDuCr, Rule 3-310. Cf Madison v. Grafftix Fabrix,
Inc., 404 S.E.2d 37, 40 (S.C. App. 1991).
47. See Morgan v. North Coast Cable Co., 586 N.E.2d 88, 90 (Ohio 1992) (and citations
therein).
48. See, e.g., Plotnik v. Greenberg, 614 N.Y.S.2d 825, 827 (A.D. 1994).
[Vol. 32
6
California Western Law Review, Vol. 32 [1995], No. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol32/iss2/3
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION
In deciding a disqualification motion therefore, the initial inquiry is often
whether an attorney-client relationship between challenged counsel and the
party seeking disqualification ever existed.49 In most instances this is not a
complicated question. However, a review of reported intellectual property
cases in which motions for disqualification were made reveals that challenges
to the moving party's claim to "former client status" have been made quite
frequently.5"
These disputes over whether an attorney-client relationship existed may
be explained, at least in part, by the nature of the patent application
procedure. In the process of applying for patents attorneys tend to become
involved in relationships with individuals and entities other than their formal,
fee-paying clients. Sometimes these relationships are intimate and
protracted. As a consequence, the individuals and entities with whom the
attorneys are involved, although not fee-paying clients, may come to believe
(or at least claim they believe) that an attorney-client relationship has arisen
between them and their company's attorneys. 2
Consider the relationship formed between a company employee who
creates a new invention, and the attorney hired by the company to prepare
and prosecute the patent on that invention. When an inventor employed by
a company develops an invention in the course of her employment, she is
customarily required to execute the papers necessary for the company's patent
counsel to pursue a patent application on the company's behalf.5" Even
where the invention has been assigned to the company, however, the inventor
still must apply for the patent.54 Because this is so, inventor and patent
counsel often work closely to prepare and prosecute the patent application. 5
While the attorney may not believe his relationship with the inventor is
an attorney-client one, the inventor may think otherwise. At a minimum, the
inventor may believe her relationship with the attorney is sufficient to require
that any confidential information she imparted to the attorney may not be
used against her later, should she move on to another company and
subsequently become involved in related litigation in which the lawyer she
worked with now represents the other side. A case in point is Telectronics
49. See, e.g., Teja v. Saran, 846 P.2d 1375, 1376 (Wash. App. 1993), review denied 859
P.2d 604 (Wash. 1993); Kenn Air Corp. v. Gainesville-Alachua County Regional Airport Auth.,
593 So. 2d 1219, 1222 (Fla. App. 1992).
50. See, e.g., Telectronics Proprietary Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc., 836 F.2d 1332 (Fed. Cir.
1988); Pain Prevention Lab, Inc. v. Electronic Waveform Labs, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 1486 (N.D.
IIl. 1987) DCA Food Indus., Inc. v. Tasty Foods, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 54, 59-60 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
Cf SMI Indus. Can. Ltd. v. Caelter Indus., 586 F. Supp. 808, 816 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
51. See, e.g., Telectronics Proprietary Ltd., 836 F.2d at 1336-37.
52. Id. at 1337.
53. lId
54. Id.
55. Id. See also Sun Studs, Inc. v. Applied Theory Assocs., Inc., 772 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir.
1985). Cf Levin v. Ripple Twist Mills, 416 F. Supp. 876, 885 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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Proprietary Ltd. v. Medtronic 6 Telectronics filed a declaratory judgment
action seeking a declaration of patent invalidity, unenforceability, and
noninfringement with respect to three patents. 7 Medtronic counterclaimed
for infringement of these patents and for another patent, and sought a
declaration that the four patents were valid, infringed, and enforceable. 8
Medtronic moved to disqualify Telectronics' counsel, attorneys Nealon and
Rackman, who had served as in-house and outside counsel respectively for
American Optical Corporation (AOC), the original patent holder on one of the
patents, on the grounds that they had participated in the prosecution of that
patent for AOC.59 Although the attorneys had never worked for Medtronic,
Medtronic claimed the status of "former client" for itself, as the assignee of
the patent. It also claimed this for its employee, Barouh V. Berkovits, who
invented the fourth patent, and who was employed by AOC when the patent
was prosecuted." Medtronic further contended that Berkovits had worked
closely with the challenged lawyers in preparing and processing the patent
application.6 Berkovits alleged that he considered Nealon and Rackman to
be his lawyers, and that they had unencumbered access to all of the inventor's
files.62
It is not difficult to see why a person in this situation might believe he
had formed some type of attorney-client relationship with the lawyer with
whom he had worked. But the Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit had
little trouble concluding that an inventor is not automatically entitled to
former client status merely because, as a company employee, he assisted the
corporation's attorney in preparing and prosecuting the patent application.63
The court further found that the inventor had no reasonable expectation that
information he conveyed to the attorney would have been withheld from the
company he worked for.64 The circuit court observed that "attorneys
represent clients-not legal positions or patents. 65 On this basis, the court
held that where the moving party fails to prove the existence of an attorney-
client relationship, courts will not apply the vague standard of "an appearance
of impropriety" to create a rule "unique to the practice of patent law" that
would disqualify counsel where no actual impropriety has been exhibited.66
56. Telectronics Proprietary Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc., 836 F.2d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
57. Id. at 1333.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1334.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1337.
63. Id. at 1336-37.
64. Id. at 1337.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1338.
[Vol. 32
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In yet another patent infringement action, Pain Prevention Lab, Inc. v.
Electronic Waveform Labs, Inc.,67 the plaintiff, PPL, brought an action
against EWL-the other party to a proposed joint venture-seeking a declara-
tion that the product which PPL was selling did not infringe any of the
defendant's intellectual property rights. 8 PPL was represented in the
litigation by the law firm of Dick and Harris.69 Defendant (EWL) moved
to disqualify Harris and his firm on the grounds that Harris was allegedly
representing EWL in preparing the patent application that was to cover the
device.70 However, the district court, after thoroughly reviewing the
principles governing attorney disqualification in a number of non-intellectual
property cases, found that it was undisputed that there was never any formal
attorney-client relationship between EWL and Harris, and that there was no
proof that an implied attorney-client relationship had been created. 7'
The court observed that an attorney-client relationship does not arise
when one consults an attorney in a capacity other than as an attorney.7 2
Communicating technical information to an attorney primarily to enable the
attorney to prepare a patent application does not automatically involve the
attorney in rendering legal advice.73 Finding no evidence to suggest that
EWL independently sought legal advice from Harris, exercised control over
Harris' activity, or paid Harris for his work, the court concluded that the
prerequisite showing of an attorney-client relationship had not been met.74
One of the cases the Pain Prevention court relied on in coming to this
conclusion was DCA Food Industries, Inc. v. Tasty Foods, Inc.75 In that
case DCA moved to disqualify defendant's counsel on the basis of his prior
relationship with DCA in connection with an earlier action involving a DCA
patent.76 As in the cases previously discussed, however, the court denied the
disqualification application. The court held that, whatever subjective
impression DCA had about the attorney's role, it could not have reasonably
believed that the attorney was acting as DCA's attorney.77
67. 657 F. Supp. 1486 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
68. Id. at 1488.
69. Id. at 1495.
70. Id
71. Id. at 1496-97.
72. Id. at 1497 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr McGee Corp. 580 F.2d 1311, 1320
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978)).
73. Id. at 1497 (citing Ashland Oil Inc. v. Delta Oil Products Corp., 209 U.S.P.Q. 151,
152-53 (E.D. Wis. 1979)); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., Inc., 54 F.R.D. 44, 47 (N.D. Cal.
1971) (both holding that no attorney-client privilege attached to such information).
74. Id.
75. 626 F. Supp. 54 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
76. Id. at 55.
77. Id at 61. Cf Levin v. Ripple Twist Mills, 416 F. Supp. 876, 885 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(where the inventor sought to disqualify two patent attorneys from representing a party the
inventor accused of patent infringement, the court denied disqualification, finding that the
relationship between the inventor and the patent counsel should not be considered a "prior
representation" within the meaning of the substantial relationship test).
1996]
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A case which presents a variation on the same theme is SM! Indus.
Canada Ltd. v. Caelter Indus.78 In that case, the plaintiff acquired a patent
from the defendant's former parent corporation, then sued the defendant in
an infringement action.79 Defendant's counsel, the law firm of Limbach,
Limbach & Sutton, had previously represented the defendant's parent in an
effort to secure the patents.8" The crux of plaintiffs motion was that the
plaintiff, as assignee of an asset, had succeeded to the attorney-client privilege
of the assignor." Plaintiff contended that even though Limbach never
represented it or any of its affiliated companies, plaintiff stood in the shoes
of the former client; thus, Limbach's representation of the defendant was
adverse to plaintiff's interests within the meaning of the adverse representa-
tion rule.
2
It is easy to understand why a plaintiff would prefer not to have a firm
that prosecuted the patent for its assignor representing an adversary in an
action for infringement of that patent. Nevertheless, the court denied the
disqualification motion. The court noted that "[n]o attorney-client relation-
ship has ever existed between plaintiff and the Limbach firm...," therefore,
the court failed "to see how the plaintiff's receipt of assets from the Limbach
firm's former client confers former client status upon it within the meaning
of [the relevant ethical rule]."84 On a practical note, the court said that were
it to accept the argument advanced by the plaintiff, courts would be "open to
a deluge of spurious disqualification motions.... Any purchaser of another
firm's assets would be able to raise an adverse representation claim against
the seller's counsel in any subsequent litigation involving the transferred
assets."85
The ruling of the Federal District Court for the Northern District of New
York in SM! was not surprising in light of the prior holding of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litiga-
tion." In that case, the court held that the assignment of a patent does not
assign the attorney-client relationship along with it.87
While the SMI, DCA Food Industries, and Pain Prevention courts were
all firm in concluding that former client status should not be liberally
bestowed on those claiming that an attorney-client relationship existed
78. 586 F. Supp. 808, 816 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
79. Id. at 813.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 814.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 816.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 530 F.2d 83 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 536 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1976).
87. Id. at 90. Cf Beghin-Say v. Rasmussen, 212 U.S.P.Q. 614 (there was no attorney-client
relationship between inventor's attorney and inventor's assignee, even though the attorney
prosecuted the patent application after it had been assigned).
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between them and intellectual property counsel, not every court has agreed.
For example, in the lower court phase of the Telectronics Proprietary Ltd.
case,88 which was ultimately appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit,89 the district court indicated it was uncertain whether former
client status may be accorded to an inventor.9" Nevertheless, "[t]o permit
the same attorneys who had unrestricted access to the inventor, his records,
his knowledge and strategy and who undertook the extensive collaboration
needed to draft and prosecute his patent application to lead the attack to
undermine those efforts and invalidate the resulting patent may taint the
underlying trial and damage the integrity of the judicial process."'" In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied in part on a decision of the Eastern
District Court of Michigan.92 In that case, the court held that, whether an
attorney-client relationship exists or not, "[o]ne who assists an inventor in
preparing a patent application is quite likely to acquire from the inventor
information that could be quite useful in preparing an attack on the validity
of the patent."'93
Even though the order of disqualification in Telectronics was ultimately
reversed on appeal,94 the district court's initial decision in favor of the
moving party was significant. That decision demonstrates that when it comes
to deciding whether relationships between intellectual property attorneys and
the inventors they work with are attorney-client ones, reasonable minds can
and do differ.9"
Another case highlighting this controversy is Henry Filters, Inc. v.
Peabody Barnes, Inc.96 In that case, appellee expressly appointed the
challenged firm to advance its position in the Patent and Trademark Office,
supplied the firm with confidential information, and agreed to pay one-half
of attorney fees.97 On that basis, the Ohio Court of Appeals concluded the
lower court could have properly inferred that appellee reasonably believed the
firm owed duties to it to the same extent the firm owed duties to appellant.
The appeals court affirmed the lower court's finding that the confidential
information appellee supplied the challenged law firm could not subsequently
be used to degrade its interests.98
88. Telectronics Proprietary Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
89. Telectronics Proprietary Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc., 836 F.2d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
90. Telectronics Propriety Ltd., 690 F. Supp. at 175.
91. Id.
92. Hooper v. Steelplank Corp., 215 U.S.P.Q. 829 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
93. Telectronics Proprietary Ltd., 690 F. Supp. at 174 (citing Hooper, 215 U.S.P.Q. at 832).
94. Telectronics Proprietary Ltd., 836 F.2d 1332.
95. Cf Hooper v. Steelplank Corp., 215 U.S.P.Q. 829 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (district court
found that the individual was the alter ego of the corporation, and thus an attorney-client
relationship existed).
96. 611 N.E.2d 873 (Ohio 1992).
97. Id. at 876.
98. Id. at 876-77.
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An analogous result was reached in Brennan's Inc. v. Brennan's
Restaurants, Inc.99 In that case attorney Edward Wegmann represented the
Brennan family, which owned numerous corporations.' On behalf of the
Brennan family, he registered a trademark which was issued in the name of
Brennan's, Inc. (BI). Subsequently, the Brennan family split into two groups;
BI went to one group, and Brennan's Restaurants, Inc. (BRI) went to the
other. The BRI group used the trademark issued in the name of BI, and BI
sued BRI for trademark infringement and unfair competition. When
Wegmann appeared on behalf of BRI, BI sought to disqualify him.
Responding to the challenge, BRI argued that because Wegmann previously
represented BI and BRI jointly, no confidences arose; therefore, Wegmann
did not violate any ethical duty by representing the BRI faction against the
BI group. The Fifth Circuit Court disagreed. It said the fundamental flaw in
BRI's position was a confusion between the attorney-client evidentiary
privilege and the ethical duty to preserve a client's confidences.' The
court emphasized that the ethical duty is broader than the evidentiary duty
because the ethical duty "'exists without regard to the nature or source of
information or the fact that others share the knowledge."" 2 The court
concluded that Wegmann's conflict of interest was "readily apparent" and
Wegmann had to be disqualified.' 3
III. THE SUBSTANTIAL RELATIONSHIP TEST
Once an attorney-client relationship has been established between the
party bringing a disqualification motion and the challenged law firm, the
moving party's next hurdle is to demonstrate that there is a substantial
relationship between the work the attorney previously performed and the
work it is now performing that is allegedly adverse to the former client." 4
The Southern District of New York is usually given credit for first articulat-
ing the substantial relationship test in T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros.
Pictures. 5 However, as one judge on the same court noted more than
forty years ago: "Unfortunately, the cases furnish no applicable guide as to
what creates a 'substantial relationship."" 6
99. 590 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1979).
100. Id. at 170.
101. Id. at 172.
102. Id. (quoting ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 4-4 (1970)).
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Solow v. W.R. Grace & Co., 632 N.E.2d 437, 439 (N.Y. 1994).
105. 113 F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y.) rehg denied by 125 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
Cf Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 248 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977).
106. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See also
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Mot. Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975),
overruled on other grounds, Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc),
vacated, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
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Over the years, courts have utilized the substantial relationship test both
in the context of attorneys moving from one firm to another," 7 and in cases
involving government attorneys who return to the private sector.'08 The
decisions in these cases shed some light on how substantial relationship may
be analyzed. For example, it is now well-established that the party seeking
disqualification bears the burden of proving that the present and prior
representations are substantially related,0 9 a burden often said to be a heavy
one.11
0
Nevertheless, because of the complexity of the factual issues which
typically underlay intellectual property actions, determining whether two
actions are substantially related can be a daunting task. Two recent District
Court of New Jersey holdings exemplify this difficulty. In Ciba-Geigy v.
Alza Corp., the district court declined to disqualify counsel from repre-
senting Ciba-Geigy in a patent infringement case involving a nicotine skin
patch, despite the fact the firm formerly represented defendant Alza in
litigation involving the same type of product. The court's decision was based
on the difference it perceived between the substances involved which resulted
in differences between the two products. According to the court, because a
qualitative difference existed between the patches involved in the former and
present representations, the factual bases for them were not "substantially
related."' " However, in another decision rendered later that year in
Kaselaan & D'Angelo Associates, Inc. v. D'Angelo,"3 the same court
concluded that Ciba-Geigy had been wrongly decided. The Kaselaan court
said an examination of the factual bases underlying the successive representa-
tions was not crucial to resolving the substantially related issue. It held that,
in the absence of a supervening federal statutory or decisional law interest,
a disqualification standard that equates substantially related to factually
identical was "unnecessarily restrictive."".4  Thus, whereas the Ciba-Geigy
court concluded the fact that a firm formerly represented a defendant in
nicotine patch litigation involving transdermal delivery systems was
insufficient to prove the prior representation was substantially related to
present litigation also involving skin patches, the Kaselaan court reached the
opposite conclusion, holding that similarities in the two representations
warranted disqualification.
107. See, e.g., In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 614 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1262 (1993); Borges v. Our Lady Sea Corp., 935 F.2d 436, 439 (1st Cir.
1991).
108. See Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 1977).
109. See, e.g., In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d at 614.
110. See, e.g, Thomson U.S. Inc. v. Gosnell, 573 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1991), affid, 181
A.D.2d 558, 581 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1992) (quoting Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569
F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978)).
111. 795 F. Supp. 711 (D.N.J. 1992).
112. Id at 717-18.
113. 144 F.R.D. 235, 242 (D.N.J. 1992).
114. Id. at 243.
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Another disqualification appeal that focused on conflicts between a firm's
present and former representations was General Electric Co. v. Valeron
Corp." '5 In that case, G.E. brought a patent infringement action against
Valeron. G.E. moved to disqualify an attorney appearing on behalf of
Valeron, because he formerly worked for G.E. as a patent lawyer. G.E.
contended the attorney's prior work was substantially related to the subject
matter of the pending lawsuit." 6 The trial court agreed, as did the Sixth
Circuit on appeal." 7 The latter rejected Valeron's argument that G.E. had
to show a substantial relationship between the attorney's prior work for G.E.
and the actual issues in the present lawsuit."8 The court held that a former
client who seeks to disqualify an attorney now representing its adversary need
only show that the matters embraced within the pending suit are substantially
related to the matters or cause of action in which the attorney previously
represented it." 9
An analogous result, predicated on similar reasoning, was reached in
Quark Inc. v. Power Up Software Corp.2  In that case the defendants
contended that a pending action and a prior litigation the challenged attorney
was involved in were not substantially related. The court found, however,
that the defendants defined the inquiry too narrowly. It noted that, under
Smith v. Whatcott,'' a prior suit need not be identical--or even similar-to
a pending suit.' The two actions need merely share a related factual
context. The court found that because both the present action and the prior
action involved the same software and questions of intellectual property the
actions were substantially related.'
The bottom line is that whereas determining whether any two cases are
"substantially related" is seldom a simple task, when a disqualification motion
obliges a court to compare and contrast two intellectual property matters, the
complexity of the factual issues involved may make the determination an
exceedingly difficult one for the court. This difficulty may translate into an
opportunity for the moving party to persuade the court that a substantial
115. 608 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 930 (1980).
116. Id. at 266.
117. Id. at 267.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 812 F. Supp. 178, 180 (D. Colo. 1992).
121. 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985).
122. Quark, 812 F. Supp. at 179.
123. Id. See also Novo Terapeutisk v. Baxter Travenol Labs., 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979)
(in which the Seventh Circuit had little trouble concluding that information regarding the enzyme
labeled microbial rennet was relevant to a patent infringement action that alleged use of patented
milk-coagulating enzymes). But see Moyroud v. Itek Corp., 528 F. Supp. 707, 708 (S.D. Fla.
1981) (holding that an attorney's prior representation of defendant in an action involving patents
in the photo-typesetting field did not preclude his representation of plaintiff in a suit against
defendant for alleged infringement of other patents in the same field).
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relationship between the two matters exists even though the facts, if properly
understood by the court, would not warrant such a finding.
IV. DISQUALIFICATION OF NON-ATrORNEYS IN I.P. ACTIONS
In addition to concerns raised by the prevalence of motions to disqualify
intellectual property attorneys, intellectual property cases have also spawned
conflicts charges involving non-lawyers. For example, in Wang Laboratories,
Inc. v. CFR Assoc., Inc.,' 24 a protective order was granted in a patent
infringement suit to prohibit defendant from using plaintiff s former employee
as an expert in light of that employee's confidentiality agreement with
plaintiff.1
25
V. WHAT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ATrORNEYS CAN DO
There is nothing magical about intellectual property cases that makes
them lightning rods for conflicts charges. However, the fact that intellectual
property attorneys, and even whole practice departments, may seem to be in
an almost continuous state of flux makes them conspicuous targets for such
charges. In addition, the ambiguous nature of the relationships intellectual
property attorneys sometimes form with key players in the patent prosecution
process, as well as the complexity of the factual issues involved, inevitably
result in additional conflicts claims and disqualification motions. Obviously,
intellectual property attorneys cannot hope to avoid these problems in all
cases. However, becoming aware of the source of these charges and
recognizing that neither the inherent nature of the practice, nor the tactical
nature of their adversaries, account for all such claims may go a long way to
suggesting a partial cure.
First, intellectual property attorneys should never underestimate the
possibility that their conduct could later provide grounds for a disqualification
motion or appeal which places the vital interests of their clients in jeopardy.
Because the number of firms which specialize in intellectual property
litigation is finite, the likelihood of this type of conflict situation arising is
greatly increased when intellectual property attorneys move from firm to firm.
The peril is multiplied still further when, as in the Elan case, an entire
practice group moves to a new firm. Lateral transfers may be a fact of life,
but courts have tended to display little sympathy towards firms whose
business decisions have placed them afoul of the relevant ethical rules. In
practice, attorneys who find themselves on the wrong end of a disqualification
124. 125 F.R.D. 10 (D. Mass. 1989).
125. Id. at 13-14. See also Rigaku Corp. v. Ferro-Fluidics Corp., 800 F.2d 1115, 1118 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
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motion are apt to confront significant sanctions in addition to disqualifica-
tion. 126
Therefore, firms should be extremely careful to consider the possible
conflict implications of any proposed merger or lateral hire. Should a firm
decide to proceed with a lateral acquisition, it should consider available
options for minimizing the risk that the acquisition will precipitate a
disqualification motion. One possible option is for the firm to erect a
"screen"--sometimes called an "ethical wall"--around the tainted attor-
neys.'7 While not every court agrees that screening will suffice to cure the
conflict problem where the tainted attorneys have moved from one private
firm to another, 28 a number of courts have indicated that effective screen-
ing may be one way of averting disqualification in certain cases.' 29
Second, intellectual property attorneys would do well to remember that
an individual whom they may not consider a client may nevertheless consider
the lawyer to be his or her attorney. When it comes to a swearing match on
this issue, the putative client's reasonable perception may control. 3 While
attorneys cannot be expected to inform every person with whom they meet
that a meeting alone does not create an attorney-client relationship, attorneys
can do more to make their non-representation clear. This is especially true
when lawyers have reason to anticipate that a particular non-client may
ultimately appear on the opposite side of a suit.
Finally, once conflict allegations have been leveled, intellectual property
attorneys often make a strategic decision they would undoubtedly counsel
their own clients against: they represent themselves. 3' This is ill-advised
because an attorney who has been challenged by a disqualification motion is
often poorly equipped to objectively perceive how his conduct may be viewed
by others, including judges. As a result, the challenged attorney is not in the
126. See, e.g., In re Ellis, 822 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tenn. App. 1991) (noting that if the
probate court found that the challenged attorney's conduct was not consistent with the Code of
Professional Responsibility, it may not only disqualify him on those grounds but send a copy of
the entire court record to the Board of Professional Responsibility).
127. See, e.g., Novo Terapeutisk v Baxter Travenol Labs., 607 F.2d 186, 196 (7th Cir.
1978).
128. See, e.g., Klein v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 226 (Ct. App. 1988).
129. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lord Elec. Co. v. Titan Pac. Constr. Corp., 637 F. Supp.
1556, 1564 (W.D. Wash. 1986); Haagen-Daaz Co. v. Perche No! Gelato, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 282,
287 (N.D. Cal. 1986). But cf Atasi Corp. v. Seagate Technology, 847 F.2d 826, 831 n.5 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (declining to approve an ethical wall where the Ninth Circuit had not yet indicated
whether it would do so).
130. See, e.g., Teja v. Saran, 846 P.2d 1375, 1376-77 (Wash. App.) review denied 859 P.2d
604 (Wash. 1993); Ambac Indem. Corp. v. Bankers Trust Co., 546 N.Y.S.2d 265, 270 (1989)
("[t]he courts in ruling on motions such as this have sometimes looked to the expectations of the
prospective or putative client, rather than to the formal understanding of the attorney').
131. See, e.g., Telectronics Proprietary Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); DCA Food Industries, Inc. v. Tasty Foods, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 54 (W.D. Wis. 1985);
Motion to Determine Propriety of Representation of Adverse Parties, Cirrus Logic, Inc. v.
Prakash Aganval, et al., Santa Clara County Superior Court Action No. CV 745373 (May 30,
1995).
[Vol. 32
16
California Western Law Review, Vol. 32 [1995], No. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol32/iss2/3
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION
best position to objectively determine how to oppose such a motion. Worse
still, it may be difficult to justify to a client why the client should be obliged
to pay the fees to defend the attorney against charges that he acted unethi-
cally. Furthermore, because law firms may be reluctant to expend large
amounts of non-billable time defending such a motion themselves, there may
be a tendency to give disqualification motions less attention than they
deserve.
The ethical issues raised by disqualification motions are often quite
complex and there is an enormous body of case law that must be mastered
before an attorney can confidently frame the relevant issues for the court.
This being the case, firms that are too penny foolish to do the necessary re-
search, or too enamored of their own abilities to retain an expert who can
help them make sense of this large and complicated field, are often ill-
prepared to defend their own interests and those of their clients when targeted
by a disqualification motion. In spite of these risks, the many cases cited
hereinabove reflect that challenged firms often do defend themselves, at least
at the trial court level.
Intellectual property litigation is typically waged in federal court.
Because this is so, and because the United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that interlocutory appeals of disqualification orders are not
permitted, 32 where disqualification motions in intellectual property cases
are concerned, the trial court battle is, as a practical matter, often the only
one. 33 Given the finality of such motions, combined with the high stakes
of intellectual property litigation, intellectual property attorneys should never
underestimate the importance of caution, prevention and, ultimately, obtaining
expert help.
132. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985); Flanagan v. United States,
465 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1984); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981).
133. See e.g., Quark, Inc. v. Power up Software Corp., 812 F. Supp. 178 (D. Colo. 1992);
Elan Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., 809 F. Supp. 1383 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Pain
Prevention Lab, Inc. v. Electronic Waveform Labs, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 1486 (N.D. Ill. 1987);
DCA Food Indus., Inc. v. Tasty Foods, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 54 (W.D. Wis. 1985); SMI Indus. Can.
Ltd. v. Caelter Indus., 586 F. Supp. 808 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
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